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We investigate the causes and consequences of financial regulation by studying the political economy
of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century.  We find evidence that usury laws were binding and enforced
and that lending activity was affected by rate ceilings.  Exploiting the heterogeneity across states and
time in regulation, enforcement, and market conditions, we find that regulation tightens when it is
less costly and when it coexists with other economic and political restrictions that exclude certain groups.
Furthermore, the same determinants of financial regulation that favor one group (and restrict others)
are associated with higher (lower) future economic growth rates.  The evidence suggests regulation
is the outcome of private interests using the coercive power of the state to extract rents from other
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We study the political economy and consequences of ﬁnancial regulation through the lens of usury
laws in the U.S. during the 19th century. Usury laws are, arguably, the oldest form of ﬁnancial
regulation. Mentioned in the Bible and the Koran and dating back to ancient Rome they have long
been the subject of political and religious debate. Yet, little is known about the economics behind
this form of ﬁnancial regulation. Usury laws regulate the maximum lending rate that can be charged
and the penalties imposed for contravention. The emerging growth in state economies during the
19th century provides a wealth of cross-sectional and time-series heterogeneity in regulation and
economic activity to analyze the relationship between ﬁnancial regulation and development. The
political economy of U.S. state usury laws in the 19th century may be a microcosm for cross-country
ﬁnancial regulation today.
More broadly, this study hopes to shed light on the economics of regulation in general. The
public-interest theory of regulation hypothesizes that government intervention corrects market inef-
ﬁciencies to maximize social welfare (e.g., Feldstein (1972a 1972b), Schmalensee (1979), and Joskow
and Noll (1981)). However, as Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976, 1989), and Becker (1983) argue,
regulation may sometimes be the outcome of private interests who use the coercive power of the
state to extract rents at the expense of other groups. Hence, regulation may reduce social welfare if
it increases the beneﬁts to one particular group. We investigate the determinants and consequences
of usury laws through the guidance of the public and private interest theories.
This investigation entails answering who and what determines regulation and who beneﬁts and
loses from ﬁnancial regulation? Do usury laws serve as a social insurance mechanism that transfers
wealth across states of the world (as argued by Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998)) in the interests of
the public? Or, do private interests with political power impose usury laws to beneﬁtt h e m s e l v e s
and impede competition? In short, do usury laws protect the poor or ﬁnancially distressed, or do
they reward ﬁnancially strong incumbents by limiting access to others?
Usury laws provide a policy instrument for the mechanism of regulation to be identiﬁed. Unlike
other measures of ﬁnancial development (e.g., market capitalization or credit divided by GDP)
maximum legal rates and penalties are easy to quantify and represent direct constraints on the cost
of capital.
As a ﬁrst step in this analysis we ask whether usury laws had ﬁnancial impact. We ﬁnd that
1usury laws are binding, for at least some borrowers in some states at certain times. We show that
states increase the penalty for usury when the maximum rate becomes more binding. We also ﬁnd
usury laws signiﬁcantly aﬀect lending activity in the state. Bonds, which were not subject to usury
laws, show an increase in activity when rate ceilings decline, suggesting substitution of ﬁnancial
instruments, though bond markets at this time oﬀered ﬁnancial access almost exclusively to state
governments and large ﬁrms.
We then investigate the causes and consequences of usury law changes. The tension between
private and public interests provides an explanation for the variation in usury laws observed across
states and time. First, states impose tighter usury laws (lower maximum rates and stiﬀer penalties)
when it is less costly to do so. When current market interest rates rise close to or above the
maximum legal rate or during ﬁnancial crises, states relax restrictions by raising the rate ceiling.
When market rates fall or the crisis abates, ceilings are reimposed or tightened. Moreover, states
hit hardest by ﬁnancial crises are even more likely to alter their usury laws. Usury laws also respond
to neighboring state competition. When a bordering state relaxes its usury laws, states relax their
own usury laws, otherwise we see capital ﬂow from that state to its neighbors. These results suggest
that states vary ﬁnancial regulation according to how costly it is, implying that ﬁnancial regulation
has a real or perceived impact on economic development.
We also ﬁnd evidence that usury laws were used by incumbents with political power to control
entry and hamper competition as well as lower their own cost of capital. By limiting the maximum
legal interest rate, usury laws cause credit rationing that increases the cost of entry in the market.
Since wealthy incumbents already have access to capital via their reputation, relationships, credit-
worthiness, and ownership of assets that can be used as collateral, they are relatively immune to
these restrictions and hence, use this form of ﬁnancial regulation to prevent further competition.
As a proxy for incumbent political power in a state, we examine state suﬀrage laws that restrict
who can vote based on wealth. States that impose restrictions only allowing land owners and tax
payers to vote keep political power in the hands of wealthy incumbents. We ﬁnd that such voting
restrictions are highly correlated with tight usury laws. In addition, the percentage of white males
who voted in the most recent election is negatively correlated with restricted suﬀrage laws and tighter
usury laws. Economic historians argue that suﬀrage laws are primarily driven by private interests
[Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997), Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2005), Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloﬀ
(2000), and Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000)] and are less aﬀected by general economic conditions,
2making it an eﬀectual proxy for incumbent interests. Consistent with this argument, we ﬁnd that
suﬀrage laws are not aﬀected by ﬁnancial crises. Moreover, after a ﬁnancial crisis, states with
stronger voting restrictions are even more likely to reimpose and tighten usury laws.
As further corroboration of private interests, we ﬁnd a positive relationship between suﬀrage
restrictions and other forms of economic regulation, namely restrictions on general incorporation
that permit free entry of ﬁrms. This evidence indicates usury laws are adopted in conjunction
with other exclusionary policies designed to limit access to other groups. According to the public-
interest theory, regulation is supposed to help underserved or disadvantaged groups and is therefore
intended to be inclusive. In addition, unlike usury laws, incorporation restrictions are not altered
during ﬁnancial crises. Since incorporation restrictions do not constrain already incorporated ﬁrms,
this result is consistent with incumbent ﬁrm private interests lifting rate ceilings during a ﬁnancial
crisis to loosen their own constraint, but maintaining incorporation restrictions to deter new entry.
We then consider which incumbent group’s private interests are best being served by these
policies by examining industrial versus ﬁnancier interests in setting regulation. To distinguish
between the private interests of these two groups, we examine another form of ﬁnancial regulation
that should appeal diﬀerentially to banks and industrialists. Free banking laws, which allow outside
banks to compete directly in the state, are a natural candidate for this task since incumbent banks
want to restrict bank entry, while incumbent industrialists are either indiﬀerent or may wish to
foster bank competition to lower their own cost of capital. We ﬁnd that the combination of policies
most consistent with industrial incumbent interests best explains usury laws. We ﬁnd no relation
between other measures of bank market or political power and usury laws.
We also show that the same determinants of maximum legal rates capture the penalties for
usury. Penalties are lighter during ﬁnancial crises, respond to competition, and are more strict
when suﬀrage and incorporation laws are restrictive. Hence, enforcement of usury laws, as proxied
by penalties, also moves in conjunction with rate ceilings.
To test whether public interests inﬂuence usury laws, we examine other state policies designed
to protect the poor such as bankruptcy stay and debt moratoria laws. We also examine newspaper
circulation and the prevalence of political and corruption coverage as a proxy for when public
interests are likely to be heightened. Finally, since the public interest view argues that usury laws
help smooth idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., social insurance motive of Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998)),
we also examine agricultural shocks that had little to no eﬀect on the industrial sector, whose
3private interests we hypothesize are being served by usury laws. We employ shocks to agricultural
technology, extreme weather, demand, and international commodity prices and exploit the cross-
sectional and time variation in state exposure to these shocks. None of the public interest proxies —
laws protecting the poor, news coverage, and agriculture shocks — exhibit any link to usury laws. We
also consider alternative explanations for usury, including bank market power, bureaucratic costs,
and religious motives, and ﬁnd no evidence in favor of these alternative explanations.
Finally, we ﬁnd a strong positive relationship between changes in usury laws and future changes
in economic growth. The eﬀect is much weaker for the industrial sector, consistent with industrial
incumbents being less aﬀected by lending restrictions. In addition, within the industrial sector, we
ﬁnd that value added growth increases faster than establishment growth, implying that the change
in value for pre-existing ﬁrms (incumbents) is larger than the creation of new ﬁrms. This result is
consistent with incumbent private interests setting policies for their own beneﬁta tt h ee x p e n s eo f
potential new entrants. Rather than draw any causal conclusions, we argue that private interests
drive both ﬁnancial policy and growth and provide evidence that state legislatures argued these laws
aﬀected the ﬂow of capital and future growth.
Our results relate to the literature on the economics of regulation and complement research on the
political economy of ﬁnancial regulation. Peltzman (1965) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999) argue
that ﬁnancial regulation is determined by private interests. Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose an
interest group theory of ﬁnancial development, where both incumbent ﬁnanciers and industrialists
oppose ﬁnancial development because it breeds competition. Braun and Raddarz (2004) show
that the relative strength of interest groups determines the level of ﬁnancial system sophistication.
Feijen and Perotti (2006) show that weak democratic institutions allow incumbent interest groups to
capture ﬁnancial regulation and Perotti and Volpin (2006) provide evidence that entry in ﬁnancially
dependent sectors is higher in countries with better investor protection.
Our ﬁndings also complement research on the relation between ﬁnancial development and eco-
nomic growth (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad (2001), and Levine and Zervos (1998)), which argues that ﬁnancial development fosters
growth. If ﬁnance is so beneﬁcial, however, then why do some economies remain less ﬁnancially
developed? The tension between private and public interests provides an explanation. The same
determinants of ﬁnancial regulation that seem to favor a particular group and limit access to others,
are also associated with lower future economic growth, highlighting the endogenous relation between
4ﬁnancial development and growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I develops the theoretical framework
and testable hypotheses on ﬁnancial regulation. Section II describes state usury laws and their
evolution in the U.S. during the 19th century. Section III analyzes whether usury laws matter and
are binding. Section IV presents a case study from the panic of 1819 that highlights our main
conclusions. Section V examines the determinants of usury laws, focusing on market conditions and
the tension between private and public interests. Finally, Section VI examines the relation between
usury laws and economic growth and Section VII concludes.
I. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses
We layout the hypotheses to be tested on ﬁnancial regulation from the public and private interest
views as they pertain to usury laws.
A. The Private-Interest Group Hypothesis
The private-interest theory treats regulation as a process in which speciﬁc groups use the coercive
power of the state to extract rents at the expense of other groups. The following predictions emerge
from applying the private-interest theory to usury laws.
Well-organized and powerful incumbent groups may use regulation to capture rents at the ex-
pense of other groups by imposing maximum legal rates. Established incumbents, for example, can
either ﬁnance new projects out of earnings without accessing external credit markets or already have
an established reputation in the credit market and pledgeable collateral, and thus are not bound
by the maximum legal rate. Incumbents may, therefore, beneﬁt from usury laws if they discourage
entry from others who cannot access ﬁnance as easily. The notion that access to ﬁnance can be
used as a barrier to entry is a central theme in Rajan and Zingales (2003, 2004).
Incumbents weigh the marginal costs and beneﬁts of ﬁnancial regulation. When the marginal
cost of capital increases, usury laws are relaxed because they start to bind on incumbents themselves.
We proxy for the marginal cost of capital using periods of high market interest rates, ﬁnancial crises,
and when neighboring states compete for outside capital by altering their own usury laws.
Prediction 1. Usury laws tighten (relax) when the cost of capital declines (rises), particularly for
5states more sensitive to capital shocks.
This prediction follows from Becker (1983). The loss of rents reduces the pressure for continued
regulation of interest rates. The higher cost of usury laws and the shrinkage in incumbents’ wealth
leads the state to try to restore a politically optimal distribution. When the beneﬁts from credit
competition outweigh the private beneﬁts of surplus division, even incumbents will favor usury
repeal. During intense periods of high interest rates, competition for capital, and ﬁnancial crises, it
is likely the beneﬁts from increased capital outweigh those from surplus division and usury ceilings
are lifted. Conversely, when market interest rates subside and the ﬁnancial crisis abates, private
beneﬁts of surplus division will once again dominate and usury ceilings are reinstated.
Prediction 1 is also consistent with the public-interest theory. Without private interests there
is no tension between credit competition and surplus division, hence usury laws will simply follow
market rates.
The ability of incumbents to dictate ﬁnancial regulation in their own private interests depends
on their relative political power within the state.
prediction 2. Usury laws are more strict in states where incumbents have more political power.
This general prediction emerges from Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Becker (1983), and Rajan
and Zingales (2004).1 States respond less to economic forces when incumbents exert their political
inﬂuence to protect their own interests. Incumbents do not need ﬁnancial development to ensure
ﬁnancial access.
If usury laws are used by incumbents to exclude new entry, then other exclusionary policies are
likely simultaneously adopted by the state to protect incumbent interests. Financial restrictions are
only one way of hampering competition and more direct restrictions on new entry are likely taken
as well to protect incumbent interests.
prediction 3. Usury laws will coexist with other policies designed to exclude new entrants when
1Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) also analyze a rent seeking motive for usury laws. However, in their analysis,
maximum legal rates rise with the political power of the wealthy since they want to charge higher interest rates to the
poor, whereas we predict that maximum legal rates will be lower since the wealthy use ﬁnance as a barrier to entry
and wish to lower their own cost of capital.
6incumbents have political power.
B. The Public-Interest Hypothesis
According to the public-interest theory, the government intervenes to correct market ineﬃciencies
and maximize social welfare. The public interest view argues that usury laws protect borrowers
from creditor market power.
prediction 4. States with more competitive credit markets have more lax usury laws.
Since the public interest view argues for the protection of borrowers who face creditor market
power, usury laws should coexist with other policies designed to assist the disadvantaged.
prediction 5. Usury laws will coexist with other policies designed to protect the poor.
During times of intense public scrutiny, the demand for public policy to assist the general
population may be greatest. Hence,
prediction 6. Usury laws will tighten when public interests are given more prominence.
Finally, Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) model usury laws as a primitive means of social in-
surance. When banks have market power, ﬁnancial regulation transfers income to states of the
world where individuals have a high marginal utility of income, from states of the world where they
have a low marginal utility of income more eﬃciently. This insurance mechanism helps smooth
idiosyncratic shocks.
prediction 7. Usury laws help smooth idiosyncratic shocks.
C. Impact on Lending and Economic Growth
The premise underlying both the public and private-interest theories implies ﬁnancial development,
proxied by usury laws, impacts ﬁnancial access which aﬀects economic growth.
prediction 8. States with tighter usury laws will experience lower lending activity and lower rates
7of economic growth.
This prediction is a direct application of the Schumpeterian view of the relationship between ﬁnancial
regulation, ﬁnancial development, and growth. A more developed ﬁnancial sector is more eﬃcient
in reallocating capital to its best use.
prediction 9. The impact on economic growth from usury will be weaker for those sectors less
aﬀected by lending restrictions.
This last prediction attempts to highlight the role ﬁnancial regulation plays in aﬀecting economic
growth by exploiting heterogeneity in the eﬀectiveness of usury laws across sectors or ﬁrms.
II. Usury Laws in the United States
Usury laws in America date back to at least 1641 when Massachusetts set the maximum legal rate
at 8%. The rest of the original 13 colonies enacted their usury laws during the 18th century and the
remaining 20 states we study adopted their usury laws in the 19th century. Usury laws regulate the
maximum legal interest rate that can be charged on a loan and the penalties imposed on lenders
for violating this rate. By restricting the maximum legal rate of interest with no relation to risk,
usury laws make the ﬁnancing of some risky, yet proﬁtable, projects illegal. Usury laws apply to
the residence of the loan or borrower, regardless of the location of the lender. Hence, banks in a
state without usury laws are subject to the usury laws of the state where the borrower resides or
the loan is made.
The source of the data for both the maximum legal rates and the penalty is Holmes (1892). The
penalty for usury typically made a distinction between ‘loss’ and ‘forfeiture’. Lenders that violated
the law could have lost the legal interest and/or the principal if the law denied their collection from
the borrower. Moreover, in some states lenders were subject to forfeiture of up to triple the amount
of the principal, or triple the illegal interest. We construct a qualitative index of the penalty.2
2The penalty index is constructed as follows. A state gets a score of 0.5 for loss of the illegal interest, 1 for loss of
the entire interest and 0 otherwise. Likewise, a state gets a score of 1 for loss of the principal and 0 otherwise. Since
forfeiture is not limited to the nominal amounts of the principal or interest, a state gets a score of 1 for forfeiture of
the nominal amount of the principal 2 or 3 for forfeiture twice or triple the principal, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, a
state gets 0.5 for forfeiture of only the illegal interest, 1 or 1.5 for forfeiture twice or triple the illegal interest, and 0
otherwise. When the penalty is the forfeiture of the entire interest the score is 1. None of the states forfeited more
than the entire amount of interest although several states set the penalty at triple the illegal interest. An index of the
severity of penalties is constructed as the sum of these measures across all dimensions of the usury penalty code.
8In 19th century America, there was substantial heterogeneity in usury laws across states and
time. Table 1 reports the heterogeneity of usury laws across 33 states and over time. States are
sorted in ascending order by their time-series average maximum legal rate and summary statistics
for both the maximum legal rates and the total penalty are reported. The mean maximum legal rate
for each state over the entire time period for which the state has usury laws on its books is reported
in the ﬁrst column of Table 1. The average legal maximum rate ranged from 5.73% in Virginia to
no limit in California during the sample period. For the purpose of calculating means, if a state has
no limit on the maximum legal rate in a given year, we employ 5% plus the maximum legal rate
ceiling observed in that year across all states as the eﬀective maximum rate.3 The second and third
columns of Table 1 report the minimum and maximum legal rates over time for a state and the
fourth and ﬁfth columns report the number of positive and negative changes, respectively, to the
maximum legal rate for each state. More than half (17) of the states eventually lifted the ceiling on
rates and allowed for no rate limit at some point during the sample period, while nearly half (16)
of the states never repealed their usury laws. Many states changed their rate limits multiple times
and in multiple directions. Virginia, for instance, increased its rate ceiling twice and reduced it on
three separate occasions. The number of positive and negative changes for a given state suggests
that policy makers believed usury laws to be impactful, otherwise why change them?
The next ﬁve columns of Table 1 report the same summary statistics for the penalty for charging
usurious rates. There is substantial heterogeneity across states and for a given state over time in the
penalties imposed for violating usury. States not only raise and lower the interest rate ceiling, but
also alter the penalties for exceeding the ceiling. This evidence indicates variation in enforcement as
well. The last row of Table 1 reports that the correlation between the maximum legal rate and total
penalty is −0.36. States with low rate ceilings adopt stiﬀ penalties to enforce them. If the penalties
are innocuous or irrelevant, either because the maximum rate does not bind or is not enforced, why
change them?
The last column of Table 1 reports the year of statehood for each state (year when the state joined
the union). States that joined the union later tended to adopt higher maximum legal rates and less
3We have also used a ﬂat rate of 25%, which is 5% higher than the maximum rate observed across all years and
states in the sample, and a ﬂat rate of 20%, which is the maximum observed rate, for any state-year with no rate
limit. In addition, we have employed censored regressions to handle states with no rate limit. Results in the paper
are robust to these alternative speciﬁcations for coding states with no rate limit.
9stringent penalties.4 There may be many reasons why older states tended to have more stringent
usury laws than younger states: life cycle growth patterns, greater need for usury protection, more
developed banking systems, more bureaucratic capital, and perhaps more likely to have private
interest groups with stronger political clout. However, the general time trend is toward liberalization,
as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 plots the time-series evolution of usury laws in the U.S. by plotting
cross-state averages of maximum legal rates and the penalty index annually. Since age has both
as i g n i ﬁcant time-series and cross-sectional association with usury laws, we will employ state and
year ﬁxed eﬀects to diﬀerence out these eﬀects and will explicitly control for state age as a regressor
in all of our tests, which is equivalent to controlling for a state-speciﬁc linear time trend. Since age
may be correlated with private and/or public interests, this control may understate our ﬁndings.
F i g u r e1a l s od e p i c t st h eﬁnancial crises of 1857, 1873, and 1884 as well as the end of the Civil
War (1865). Usury laws tend to relax following each of these episodes, both in terms of higher
maximum rates and lower penalties.
III. Do Usury Laws Matter?
We ﬁrst establish whether usury laws were binding and had a real impact on ﬁnancial access. Is
ﬁnancial regulation innocuous because it can be circumvented by market participants through clever
contracting (Wright (1949))? North (1990) discusses how contracts attempting to disguise interest
and evade usury laws by specifying “late payment penalties,” manipulating exchange rates, or other
devices imposed additional costs that would not be present in the absence of usury laws.5 These
costs and risks have some impact on ﬁnancial development.
Another possibility is that usury rates simply do not bind and therefore never have to be enforced.
Usury ceilings may simply change with market rates so that the constraint is never binding. However,
both of these explanations have diﬃculty reconciling the heterogeneity in rate ceilings and penalties
we observe across states and time.6 Ultimately, however, these are empirical questions, which we
4Rockoﬀ (2003) ﬁnds a similar pattern.
5In addition to the costs of writing complex contracts, North (1990) points to the diﬃculty in enforcing such
contracts, which often deterred lenders, particularly foreign lenders. Usury laws not only impose contracting and
enforcement costs on lenders directly, but also may signal the danger of enforcement and expropriation in general for
outside lenders. Temin and Voth (2005, 2006) ﬁnd that lending activities in England during the 18th century were
constrained by usury laws. Wright (2002) also argues that banks were reluctant to violate usury laws because doing
so placed their corporate charter at risk.
6The mindset of legislators at the time was that usury laws certainly did bind, as suggested by some of the quotes
in Appendix A. Rockoﬀ (2003, p. 24-25) discusses how “Friedman (1963) documents a number of cases in which the
fear of a capital drain to states with more liberal usury laws was brought up in legislative debates. For example a
10attempt to answer in this section.
A. Do usury laws bind?
We begin by examining the frequency with which usury ceilings would be binding for each state
using several measures of market interest rates. We obtain data for 18th and 19th century market
interest rates from Homer (1963). We use the yields on long-term British government securities
beginning in 1727, the yields of high-grade long-term American bonds from 1798, the average annual
U.S. commercial paper rate from 1831, New England municipal bond yields from 1798, high-grade
railroad bond yields from 1857, New York city real estate mortgage rates from 1869, and the average
annual call money rate from 1857. The call money rate is the overnight lending rate between banks
in New York on collateralized loans. Except for the mortgage rates, none of the above rates were
subject to usury laws. All series are annual (call money rates are available monthly) and end in
1891 to coincide with our usury law data. Panel A of Table 2 reports the correlation matrix of these
various interest rates. The correlations are quite high. We also construct an index of interest rates
by weighting each series using the principal components of the covariance matrix of these seven
interest rates. The average correlation between each series and the principal component index is
0.85.
Figure 2 plots the time-series evolution of the cross-state average rate ceiling and minimum rate
ceiling annually relative to the U.S. bond rate, commercial paper rate, and call money rate, which
were not subject to usury laws. The ﬁgure shows that during certain times, usury rate ceilings were
binding for the average state, and were quite often binding for states with the lowest rate ceilings.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the frequency (number and percentage of years) with which the
maximum legal rate for a state is binding relative to the U.S. bond rate, commercial paper rate,
high-grade railroad bond rate, and call money rate on a state-by-state basis. These rates were not
subject to usury laws and hence, could (and often did) exceed usury rate ceilings. Moreover, the
U.S. bond, commercial paper, railroad bond, and call money rates are likely lower bounds on the
prevailing interest rates faced by small borrowers at the time who were greater credit risks and had
less collateral. For example, if the call money rate, which is an overnight collaterized interbank
rate, exceeds the maximum legal rate, it is almost surely the case that actual borrowing rates faced
legislative committee in Connecticut in 1871 “painted a picture of money ﬂeeing to Massachusetts,” where the usury
law had been repealed in 1867.” (see Murray (1866)).
11by less creditworthy households or ﬁrms for maturities longer than one day on non-collateralized
loans are even more bound by the usury restriction. As Panel B of Table 2 shows, for many states
there are a signiﬁcant fraction of years when the usury restriction would bind, where state-imposed
interest rate ceilings were below market interest rates. In addition, these rate diﬀerences could be
substantial, suggesting usury laws could impose tight constraints on lending at certain times. The
data also highlights the tremendous heterogeneity over time for a given state and across states, with
some states having binding rate ceilings a signiﬁcant fraction of the time, while others never being
constrained.
B. Impact on enforcement and lending activity
We exploit the heterogeneity in binding usury rate ceilings in Table 3 to address whether usury
laws had real ﬁnancial impact. Panel A of Table 3 addresses whether penalties for violating usury
become tougher when rate ceilings become more binding. Penalties are a form of enforcement. We
regress the penalty for violating usury on the diﬀerence between the maximum legal rate in each
state and market interest rates. We use the U.S. bond rate, the principal component index rate,
and a Regional rate that allows for variation in interest rates across states at a point in time. The
Regional rate is constructed as the New England municipal bond rate for all states in the New
England region, the New York city mortgage rate for New York state, and the U.S. bond rate for all
other states. We run the regressions in ﬁrst diﬀerences, with controls for age and state ﬁxed eﬀects
when using the U.S. bond and principal components index rates, and controls for age, state, and
year ﬁxed eﬀects when using the regional rates. Standard errors are clustered by year. Panel A of
Table 3 shows that penalties decrease (increase) when market rates fall below (exceed) maximum
legal rates and the usury ceiling becomes less (more) binding.
Panel B of Table 3 examines the impact of usury laws on lending activity. The ﬁrst four columns
report results for regressions of the change in total amount of loans and discounts per capita on the
change in maximum legal rate and the change in the diﬀerence between the maximum legal rate
and market interest rates. Loan volume data is obtained from state-level national banks’ balance-
sheets for the years 1865 to 1890 from the reports of the Comptroller of the Currency. Changes in
lending volume per capita increase when changes in the maximum rate increase. The elasticity of
per capita lending volume to rate ceilings is 0.98. We obtain equally sharp results when employing
the maximum rate relative to market interest rates as a regressor. When market interest rates
12approach or exceed the maximum legal rate, usury laws become more binding and loans per capita
decrease. These results suggest that rate ceilings have an eﬀect on lending volume.
The last four columns of Panel B of Table 3 show that changes in bonds for circulation per
capita have a relationship with usury law changes that are of opposite sign to loans per capita. The
opposite signed relationship between usury laws and bonds indicates that lenders are substituting
other ﬁnancial activities which are not subject to usury laws in place of loans that are subject to
usury restrictions when usury laws become tighter and more costly. This evidence is inconsistent
with a demand-based story for the drop in lending activity and further supports the notion that
usury laws had real ﬁnancial impact.
IV. A Case Study in Private vs. Public Interests
In this section we present a case study of the relation between private interests and usury laws during
the panic of 1819. This case study illustrates the main themes and conclusions from our empirical
analysis: that usury laws were largely inﬂuenced by the private interests of wealthy industrialists.
We show in the following sections a more general pattern linking usury laws and regulation to
private interests throughout the 19th century.
According to Rothbard (1962), the panic of 1819 was America’s ﬁrst great economic crisis and
depression. Prices of imported goods dropped with the inﬂux of foreign goods during the peace
years that followed the 1812 war. Prices of exports of farm staples dropped when European demand
declined in 1818. According to Wright (1949):
The gathering storm broke in 1819. Within a few months cotton fell from 90 to 51 cents
a bushel...The most acute distress was felt in the Middle Atlantic states and in the Ohio
Valley, though the cotton belt was also hard hit. In New York City in 1820 a tenth of the
people was said to be receiving poor relief, and for the ﬁrst time the country was forced to
consider the serious problem of urban pauperism... As always at such times, a widespread
demand for relief arose, and varied measures to provide this were advocated. To protect
debtors, stay and replevin laws were passed and the statutes governing imprisonment for
debt modiﬁed.
The movement for debt relief and help for the poor arose from public interest. According to Bonelli
(2003), during the depression of 1819 to 1820 private philanthropy paralleled by public relief were
part of a great philanthropic eﬀort. Provision for the poor in New York City included supplies of
winter fuel and health and medical services. President James Monroe advocated debt relief in his
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February 28, 1821. As part of the public eﬀorts, state legislatures passed debt moratoria laws know
as “stay laws” which postponed foreclosure of property. Some states also passed minimum appraisal
laws that prevented ‘ﬁre sales’ of properties below a certain minimum price. While these laws also
provoked strong opposition in some states, many states — especially the frontier states — eventually
adopted some form of debt relief legislation between 1818 and 1822.7
However, during this period of debt relief sentiment, none of the states relaxed their usury laws.
Moreover, in 1820, the maximum legal rate was higher than 6% in 5 out of the 9 frontier states (8%
in Alabama and Mississippi, 10% in Louisiana and Missouri, and no limit in Illinois, while it was
6% in Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee). Hence, the frontier states that were passing stay
laws aimed at helping the poor, were also adopting more lax usury laws. In contrast, states with
more strict usury laws were also less likely to adopt pro-debtors laws.8 This evidence suggests that
usury laws coexist with other policies not aimed at helping the poor, which contradicts the public
interest view that strict usury laws are designed to help debtors.
Bolton and Rosentahl (2002) show that states with restricted suﬀrage laws were also less likely
to pass debtor relief legislation. Stay laws and other forms of debt relief were more prevalent in the
frontier states that did not have restricted suﬀrage laws, where debtors may have had more political
voice. Since these states also had more lax usury laws, this evidence further suggests that when
debtors have political power they are more likely to adopt lax rather than strict usury laws, which
is again inconsistent with the public interest view.
The panic of 1819 also provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that industrialists oppose
ﬁnancial development because it breeds competition. The economic downturn also led to a demand
for a protective tariﬀ for American industry. Domestic industry that had expanded during the
War of 1812, which virtually blocked foreign trade and imports of manufacturing goods, was hit by
the impact of foreign competition in the postwar period. When the depression came in late 1819,
the protectionists argued that free trade caused the depression, and that protection would bring
prosperity. The industrialists also proposed to curtail credit in order to limit competition (Rothbard
(1962) p. 176). The New York Daily Advertiser pointed out that: “abolition [of credit] would help
the large capitalists at the expense of the small, since it was the young and enterprising merchants
7Bolton and Rosentahl (2002), Rothbard 1962.
8The maximum legal rate in the non-frontier states in 1820 was 6%, except New jersey, New York, and South
Carolina where the maximum legal rate was 7%
14who would be forced to abandon trade for lack of capital.”
The evidence from the depression of 1819 suggests that states that did not have restrictive
suﬀrage laws were more likely to pass pro-debtors laws and also had lax usury laws. Moreover, in-
cumbent industrialists were trying to limit competition in the product markets at the same time by
curtailing the availability of credit. These facts suggest that the private interests of wealthy indus-
trialists were driving a host of policies, including ﬁnancial regulation, around the 1819 depression.
We now turn to a more general and comprehensive analysis of the determinants of usury laws.
V. The Determinants of Usury Laws
In this section we study the factors that determine the adoption and repeal of usury laws across
states and time and attempt to link these to the private and public interest theories of Section I.
A. Is regulation tighter when it is less costly?
Table 4 provides results for a variety of tests of prediction 1 that strictness of usury laws is inversely
related to the cost of regulation. Panel A of Table 4 examines how maximum legal rates respond
to the proximity of market rates to the usury ceiling. Speciﬁcally, we regress the change in the
maximum rate for a state on the lagged change in the diﬀerence between the maximum legal rate
and the average U.S. bond rate last period.9 The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient indicates that
when the market interest rate approaches or exceeds the usury ceiling in year t − 1, states increase
their usury ceiling subsequently in year t. The next two columns of Panel A of Table 4 employ the
principal components index rate and the Regional rate (which allows both state and year ﬁxed eﬀects
to be employed) as market interest rate proxies and ﬁnds nearly identical results. The last column
of Panel A of Table 4 repeats the regression for Regional rates separating the diﬀerence between the
lagged change in the maximum legal rate and Regional rate into positive and negative components,
where the Regional rate exceeds the maximum rate and where it falls below the maximum rate.
When the local interest rate is greater than the maximum rate, usury restrictions become binding
and we see a subsequent increase in the state’s maximum allowable rate to alleviate this constraint,
indicated by the positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. When the regional rate falls below the maximum
9For states that change their rate ceiling to no limit, we use a number that is 5 percentage points higher than the
maximum rate ceiling across all states in that year. This rate turns out to be higher than any of the market interest
rates in that year as well. We conﬁrm in unreported results that our ﬁndings are robust to using a maximum rate
of 25 percent for no limit states, which is 5 percent higher than the maximum rate observed over the entire sample
period for any state, and to using censored regressions to handle no rate limits.
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to tighten the restriction the following period. These results provide evidence in favor of prediction
1 that usury laws loosen when they become costly and tighten when they are inexpensive.
Panel B of Table 4 examines how maximum rates change and respond to ﬁnancial crises, where
the marginal cost of capital is especially high. We regress a state’s maximum legal rate on dummies
for ﬁnancial crisis years (1857, 1873, and 1884) and the year after each crisis.10 Maximum rates
rise during and following times of ﬁnancial distress, consistent with prediction 1. States raise their
maximum legal rate by 1.3 percentage points during ﬁnancial crises. Since interest rates are partic-
ularly high during these times, the second column of Panel B of Table 4 reports results including
the lagged diﬀerence between the maximum rate and Regional rate as a regressor. Both variables
are signiﬁcant, indicating that ﬁnancial crises aﬀect usury laws even beyond the higher market rates
that prevail during these times. Since ﬁnancial crises are deﬁned by quantity restrictions as well as
high prices, this result makes sense. Likewise, column 3 of Panel B shows that the interaction be-
tween the two is negative — in ﬁnancial crises, states with the most binding usury laws subsequently
raise their rate ceiling more.
The last three columns of Panel B of Table 4 add measures of a state’s sensitivity to ﬁnancial
crises and interact them with the dummy for ﬁnancial crisis years. Prediction 1 also implies that
states more sensitive to capital shocks will more likely repeal usury laws during a crisis. To capture
a state’s sensitivity to ﬁnancial crises, we use the total mileage of railroads that defaulted during
the ﬁnancial crisis of 1873 for every state. This data is recorded as of September, 1873 and comes
from Benmelech (2006). Since railroads were not typically aﬀected by usury laws because they had
substantial collateral and could issue public debt (which was not subject to usury laws), this proxy
should capture a state’s sensitivity to the crisis of 1873 that is otherwise unrelated to usury laws.
We scale track mileage of defaulted railroads by the number of manufacturing establishments in the
state from the 1870 Census. The fourth column of Table 4 shows that states hit hardest by the
ﬁnancial crisis were more likely to raise rate ceilings subsequently. The last two columns employ two
additional measures of crisis sensitivity: the amount of manufacturing capital per manufacturing
establishment in 1870 and the amount of machinery capital per capita in 1870. Benmelech (2006)
shows that the manufacturing sector and particularly the machinery sector were hit hardest by
10We have also included a dummy for the ﬁve years after the end of the civil war (1865 to 1869) and obtained very
similar results.
16the 1873 ﬁnancial crisis. Consistent with prediction 1, we ﬁnd positive interaction terms for both
measures of crisis sensitivity.
Panel C of Table 4 examines how maximum rates and lending activity respond to competition,
as another proxy for the cost of capital. The ﬁrst column of Panel C of Table 4 reports results from
regressing the maximum legal interest rate for a state in a given year on the average maximum legal
interest rate of states that border it as well as the average maximum rate for states that do not border
it in that same year. The maximum legal rate for a state in each year is highly positively correlated
with the maximum rate imposed in bordering states in that same year, even after accounting for
year ﬁxed eﬀects, which eliminate general interest rate levels or economic conditions, and state
ﬁxed eﬀects, which eliminate any time-invariant unobserved eﬀects at the state level. This ﬁnding
suggests that a state’s variation in rate ceilings over time is in part determined by what its neighbors
are doing, which we interpret as a response to competition for capital. Contemporaneous changes
in ﬁnancial regulation are likely motivated by neighboring states competing for the same capital,
and thus aﬀecting the marginal beneﬁt and cost of capital in the state. Whether a non-border state
changes its rate has no eﬀect. The magnitude of the response is also large. A one percentage point
increase in a neighboring state’s maximum legal rate increases the state’s own legal rate by 96 basis
points.
The second column of Panel B of Table 4 interacts the wealth of the state (per capita output)
with the border rate variable and interacts the wealth of border states with the border rate variable.
Wealthy states should be less prone to competition for outside capital since their marginal utility
for capital is lower (e.g., New Jersey is more likely to follow New York than vice versa). The
interaction terms indicate that states respond less to less wealthy neighbors and respond more to
wealthier neighbors’ usury laws, consistent with this prediction.
Finally, the premise that border eﬀects represent competition for outside capital hinges on the
behavior of usury law changes actually aﬀecting capital ﬂows and lending activity. However, if
states respond optimally to competition for capital, then in equilibrium there will be no distortion
in ﬁnancing activity across states. Therefore, to test this premise, we need to observe the counter-
factual: what happens to state lending activity if a state does not respond to competition? The last
column of Panel C of Table 4 regresses changes in loans per capita on two dummy variables designed
to capture times when a state either does not respond to competition or responds in the opposite
direction of its neighbors. As the last column of Panel C of Table 4 shows, when a state’s neighbors
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when its neighbors tighten their ceilings and the state oppositely raises its maximum rates, loans per
capita increase in the state. These results indicate that failure to respond to competition impacts
subsequent loan activity.
An interesting question is why we are able to observe the counterfactual? If failure to respond
to competition has adverse capital consequences, why do some states not respond? The tension
between private and public interests provides an answer, since states at certain times may tradeoﬀ
the public beneﬁts of greater capital supply for the private beneﬁts of certain groups within the
state beneﬁtting from limited capital access. While the results in Table 4 are consistent with both
the private and public interest theories, we turn now to tests that attempt to distinguish private
and public interest motives as they pertain to usury laws.
B. Private interests and incumbent political power
Table 5 examines the role incumbent political power plays in determining a state’s usury laws, as a
proxy for private interests.
B.1 Restricted suﬀrage laws
We follow the literature on the relationship between restricted suﬀrage laws and the power of the elite
and property rights (e.g., Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997), Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2005), Engerman,
Haber, and Sokoloﬀ (2000), and Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000)), by using state-level suﬀrage laws
as a proxy for the political power of incumbents. Restricted suﬀrage laws were generally instituted
to keep voting control in the hands of the established incumbent elite and prevent political power
from swinging to a new group. Voting in the 19th century United States was largely a privilege
reserved for wealthy white men who owned a signiﬁcant amount of properties, though voting rights
varied by state. Restricted suﬀrage implies more concentrated voting power to push policies that
further the private interests of the voting group.
Panel A of Table 5 reports results from regressing the maximum legal interest rate for a state
in a given year on a dummy variable indicating whether the state has restricted suﬀrage laws that
only allow land owners and/or those who paid taxes to vote in that year. We focus exclusively on
suﬀrage restrictions that are based on wealth as our proxy for incumbent elite power, and ignore
suﬀrage laws based on race or gender since additional factors may be contributing to these laws.
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in that same year. Controlling for state and year ﬁxed eﬀects, the average maximum interest rate
is 1.32 percentage points lower when restricted suﬀrage laws are present.
As another proxy for concentrated incumbent political power, we employ the percentage of white
males who did not vote in presidential elections, available for 23 states for the following election
years: 1824, 1828, 1832, 1836, 1840 and 1844.11 The second column of Panel A of Table 5 reports
regression results of the percentage of non-voting white males on the restricted suﬀrage indicator.
Restricted suﬀrage implies 12 percent fewer white males vote, controlling for state and year ﬁxed
eﬀects. The third column of Panel A reports results from regressing the maximum legal rate on
the percentage of non-voting white males. A 10 percentage point increase in voting concentration
translates into 1.5 percentage point lower rate ceiling, controlling for state and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
The fourth column of Panel A includes both restricted suﬀrage and the percentage of non-voting
white males as regressors and the ﬁfth column also includes an interaction term between them.
Both restricted suﬀrage and percentage of non-voting white males are associated with tighter usury
restrictions and the interaction between them is even more negative, implying that states where
restricted suﬀrage laws result in the most concentrated voting also have the most restrictive usury
laws. These ﬁndings support prediction 2.
The last column of Panel A of Table 5 tests the interaction between predictions 1 and 2. Specif-
ically, we document a distinct pattern in usury laws around ﬁnancial crises: states with incumbent
political power may liberalize usury laws in the short-term to accommodate the ﬁnancial crisis
(prediction 1) but then revert back to ﬁnancial constraints when the crisis abates (prediction 2).
The interaction term between restricted suﬀrage and crisis years on maximum rates is positive and
insigniﬁcant, indicating that during ﬁnancial crises, even states with incumbent political power lib-
eralize their rate ceilings since incumbents are also hit by the crisis. However, the interaction term
between restricted suﬀrage and a dummy variable for ﬁve years after the crisis shows that these
same states with incumbent political power reduce their rate ceilings after the crisis is over. All
states relax ﬁnancial regulation during a crisis, but only those states with concentrated voting power
reimpose the restrictions after the crisis subsides. This evidence supports the private interest view
of regulation and is diﬃcult to reconcile under alternative theories.
11The source of this data is Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2005).
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If suﬀrage laws are a good proxy for incumbent political power, then according to prediction 3 they
should also aﬀect other forms of regulation that beneﬁt incumbents by restricting entry. Financial
regulation is not the only barrier to entry. Incumbents with political power can restrict entry directly
using licensing or charter restrictions. During the 19th century, states limited competition from new
entrants by imposing restrictions on forming non-ﬁnancial corporations. According to Wallis (2005):
“Initially, all corporations were ‘special’: created by an act of the legislature that speciﬁed the rights
and responsibilities of each corporation individually . . . The numerous examples of truly special
privileges created by state legislatures gave substance to concerns about corruption.” One notable
example of such corruption is the case of the Camden and Amboy railroad that obtained a monopoly
of the northeast to southwest rail route in New Jersey, connecting New York and Philadelphia, in
return for giving a substantial block of stock to the state. In contrast, general incorporation laws
allowed the formation of non-ﬁnancial corporations without a special charter from the legislature.
We exploit variation in the adoption of general incorporation laws across states, which allow for
easier and faster entry of new ﬁrms. We collect data on state-level evolution of general incorporation
laws from Evans (1948).
Panel B of Table 5 tests whether restricted suﬀrage laws are correlated with restricted incorpora-
tion laws. The ﬁrst column reports the speciﬁcation with state ﬁxed eﬀects and the second column
reports results from a ﬁrst diﬀerence regression of changes on changes (both regressions include age
as a control). Both speciﬁcations show that restricted suﬀrage laws are associated with restricted
incorporation laws, implying tighter restrictions on ﬁrm entry. Having tax or wealth-based suﬀrage
restrictions increases the probability of having restricted incorporation laws by 22 percent. This
evidence supports prediction 3.
Since states with incumbent political power adopt strict usury restrictions in conjunction with
strict incorporation and voting restrictions, and since during a ﬁnancial crisis even states with
concentrated voting power liberalize their usury laws, we investigate whether incorporation and
voting restrictions are also relaxed during ﬁnancial crises. According to the private-interest view,
these policies should not be altered during these episodes because incumbents are not directly
aﬀected by them. Incumbents should still wish to maintain their political power, implying that
restricted suﬀrage laws should remain in place even during crises, and incumbents will still want to
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remain or get tighter. The alternative hypothesis, however, predicts the opposite eﬀects. The public
interest view implies a general liberalization of all policies and an omitted variable explanation also
implies all of these policies moving in the same direction during a crisis. The last four columns
of Panel B of Table 5 show that incorporation and restricted suﬀrage laws are not altered during
ﬁnancial crises, even though usury laws are being changed. This evidence is diﬃcult to explain
under any other theory besides private incumbent interests.
The results in Table 5 can be summarized as follows. Usury laws are correlated with other forms
of political and economic restrictions that are designed to exclude others from the right to vote or
start up a ﬁrm. While these policies are likely determined endogenously, this evidence suggests that
usury laws, too, were designed to exclude groups from credit markets, contrasting sharply with the
public-interest view of regulation which is designed to assist, protect, and include weaker groups.12
Moreover, during times when usury laws bind for incumbents, lending restrictions are relaxed, but
voting and charter restrictions, which are not binding for incumbents, are maintained.
C. Who are the Powerful Incumbents? Industrialists vs. Financiers
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that incumbent private interest may come from industrialists or
ﬁnanciers. We try to identify whose private interests are motivating regulation by separating the
private interests of incumbent industrialists from ﬁnanciers. While less restrictive usury laws provide
ﬁnanciers with an opportunity to ﬁnance more projects, they also facilitate entry of new ﬁnancial
institutions. We examine combinations of policies that should favor one group versus another in
order to gauge power across incumbent groups.
We begin by looking at measures where incumbent power is likely to be greatest — where re-
stricted suﬀrage and restricted incorporation laws exist. In the ﬁrst two columns of Table 6, we
regress the maximum legal rate on a dummy variable that equals one if a state in a given year
has both restricted suﬀrage and restricted incorporation laws. The other extreme set of policies
we deﬁne as being “egalitarian,” which are years in which a state has general incorporation laws
12The relationship between direct entry restrictions and usury laws presented in Table 5 is similar to the relationship
documented in Djankov et al. (2002). In a cross-country study of the regulation of entry, Djankov et al. (2002) ﬁnd
a negative relationship between the number of procedures to open a business (a measure of direct barriers to entry)
and the size of equity markets relative to GDP (a measure of ﬁnancial development). This ﬁnding is consistent with
the case study evidence from the crisis of 1819 and with our regression results, as well as Rajan and Zingales’ (2003,
2004) hypothesis that ﬁnancial regulation and entry restrictions are used complementarily.
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more power adopt more strict usury laws; maximum legal rates are 145 basis points lower in these
states. This evidence suggests that ﬁnancial and economic barriers to entry are used in complement,
consistent with the incumbent private-interest view. The most egalitarian states have signiﬁcantly
more lax maximum legal rates that are 36 basis points higher than the average maximum rate.
To distinguish the private interests of industrialists from those of incumbent ﬁnanciers or banks,
we examine other forms of ﬁnancial regulation that should appeal diﬀerentially to each group and
analyze their relationship with usury laws. Free banking laws are a natural candidate for this task
since incumbent banks want to restrict bank entry and competition, while incumbent industrialists
are either indiﬀerent or may want to foster bank competition to lower their own cost of capital.
W eu s ef r e eb a n k i n gl a w sa sa ni n v e r s ep r o x yf o rt h ep o l i t i c a lp o w e ro ft h eﬁnancial sector. Similar
to general incorporation laws that were applied to non-ﬁnancial corporations, free banking laws
enabled free entry to the banking industry in antebellum America.13
The third column of Table 6 reports regression results of the maximum legal interest rate on a
dummy variable that equals one if a state has free banking laws in a given year. Since free banking
was used in antebellum America, the regressions span the time-series of usury laws only up to 1861.
The results indicate that free banking laws are not associated with maximum legal rates. If free
banking laws are a proxy for the political power of incumbent ﬁnanciers, then this result suggests
that it is not incumbent ﬁnanciers that are setting ﬁnancial regulation.
To better distinguish the private interests of banks from industrialists, we also consider the
combination of policies most appealing to each group along three dimensions: suﬀrage, general
incorporation, and free banking laws. Industrial incumbent private interests are most aligned with
voting restrictions, incorporation restrictions, and free banking laws to promote lender competition
to reduce their own cost of capital. To capture these preferences we designate industrial power with
an indicator variable equal to one if a state-year has this combination of policies. Bank incumbent
private interests are aligned with voting restrictions, general incorporation laws that create more
potential borrowers, and restrictions on free banking laws to control bank entry. We designate bank
incumbent power with an indicator variable equal to one for state-years with these combination of
policies. Finally, we create a dummy variable to capture the most egalitarian set of policies which
13For example, according to Bodenhorn (2003), in 1821 New York’s constitution required a two-thirds majority for
the passage of a charter, which further protected the existing banks’ favored positions.
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The fourth and ﬁfth columns of Table 6 report the results from using the three indicators of
industrial, banking, and egalitarian policies. Consistent with the industrial incumbent private-
interest view, usury rates are more restrictive, about 1.2 to 1.4 percent lower, when the set of
regulation policies favors industrial power. Bank incumbent power has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on usury
ceilings, suggesting that incumbent ﬁnanciers are not driving ﬁnancial regulation. Finally, the most
egalitarian set of policies is associated with higher maximum legal rates. The evidence suggests that
ﬁnancial regulation is the outcome of a broader set of policies designed to protect private industrial
incumbent interests.
D. Penalties for violating usury
Table 7 repeats some of the main tests for the determinants of usury laws using the penalty index
for violating usury as the dependent variable instead of the maximum legal rate. Consistent with
our previous ﬁndings, states liberalize usury laws by reducing penalties during a ﬁnancial crisis and
when neighboring states liberalize, and impose stiﬀer penalties when they also have restrictions
on suﬀrage and also have restrictions on other economic policies such as incorporation laws. These
results emphasize that not only do states alter their rate ceiling in response to economic and political
conditions, but that they also simultaneously alter the enforcement mechanism of these laws, as
proxied by the penalties imposed.
E. Public interest
To directly test the public-interest view of ﬁnancial regulation we examine whether variables de-
signed to proxy for public interests inﬂuence usury laws.
E.1 Personal bankruptcy stay and debt moratoria
The ﬁrst set of proxies we employ for public interests are a set of policies designed to protect the poor
and weak debtors. We employ bankruptcy stay laws or debt moratoria passed by state legislatures
for this task and examine their relationship with usury laws. We use a dummy variable for whether
a state had bankruptcy stay laws that forgave personal debt, obtained from Coleman “Debtors and
Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt, and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900.” As the ﬁrst
column of Table 8 shows, there is no signiﬁcant relationship between personal bankruptcy stay laws
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the vote in the House of Representatives in 1822 for the relief of debtors who bought public land
from the Federal government. The percentage of representatives in each state voting in favor of
debt relief is used as a proxy for the state’s interest in protecting the poor. As the second column
of Table 8 shows, there is also no relationship between this measure and usury laws. These two
results are inconsistent with prediction 5 of the public interest theory that usury laws will coincide
with other policies designed to protect the poor.
E.2 Newspaper circulation and corruption coverage
The second set of proxies we employ for public interests are the extent of newspaper circulation
and the coverage of political and corruption stories, obtained from Gentzkow, Glaeser, and Goldin
(2005) and Glaeser and Goldin (2005), respectively. We use the number of newspapers per capita
as a proxy for when public interests are likely to be heightened. Greater circulation of mass media
likely makes it more diﬃcult for private interests to push forward their own policies and may provide
a mechanism to coalesce public interests. As the third column of Table 8 reports, there is a strong
positive relationship between newspaper circulation per capita and maximum legal rates, indicating
that usury laws were more lax when public opinion had a more widespread outlet. This evidence
suggests that if newspaper circulation is a good proxy for the strength of public interests, then those
public interests desired lax rather than tight usury laws. Hence, restrictions on lending activity do
not seem consistent with public interests.
The fourth and ﬁfth columns of Table 8 employ the extent of political and corruption coverage
of newspapers. We employ the measures used by Glaeser and Goldin (2005), which for political
coverage is the count of the word “politic” deﬂated by the count of the word “January” which
controls for the newspaper’s size, and corruption and fraud coverage which is the count of the word
“corrupt” or “fraud” deﬂated by the word count “January.” The former variable proxies for the
extent of coverage of political events and politics in general. The latter variable proxies for the
number of reported corruption and fraud events. We interpret both of these variables as proxies
for public interests that make it more diﬃcult for private interests to pass their policies. When
political coverage in newspapers is high, public interest in policies is likely heightened. In addition,
when public reporting of corruption is high, then either recent corruption activity has been high
or monitoring of corruption has improved, both of which (we hypothesize) likely amplify public
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inconsistent with prediction 6 of the public interest theory that usury laws will tighten when public
interests are more prominent.
E.3 Agricultural shocks
The third and ﬁnal set of proxies for public interests we employ are a series of agricultural shocks.
According to prediction 7 of the public interest theory, usury laws are supposed to smooth idiosyn-
cratic shocks. The evidence we have presented on market interest rates, ﬁnancial crises, and state
competition for capital are aggregate shocks.
To test this prediction, we employ shocks to the agricultural sector in each state that had little to
no eﬀect on the industrial sector, whose private interests we conjecture are determining usury laws.
We begin with agricultural technology shocks, obtained from “A History of American Agriculture”
from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) from 1780 to 1890. We assign an
indicator variable to state-years experiencing a positive technological shock to its agricultural sector.
We employ the nearest year for which we can ﬁnd data on agricultural production across various
crops to determine which states are most exposed to which crops and how the technology aﬀected
those crops (e.g., invention of the cotton gin on cotton-producing states). As the sixth column
of Table 8 shows, the relationship between agricultural technology shocks and usury laws is non-
existent.
We also employ a series of extreme weather shocks which adversely aﬀected agriculture. Similar
to the assignment of technology shocks, we identify which states were most exposed to the weather
event and how much their particular agricultural sector was aﬀected by the event based on its crop
production (e.g., Mississippi River ﬂood of 1849, which aﬀected states along the river, particularly
to the South). We assign a value of −1 to these state-years and zero otherwise. As column 7 of
Table 8 shows, there is no relationship between weather shocks to the agricultural sector and usury
laws.
We also employ a series of demand shocks for agricultural products using, for instance, the
Crimean War from 1854 to 1857, where international demand for U.S. agricultural exports boomed,
particularly wheat. Column 8 shows no relationship between these shocks and usury laws.
Finally, we also employ a series of commodity price shocks using the Froot, Kim, and Rogoﬀ
(2005) commodity price series from England and Holland which spans the 17th, 18th, and 19th
25centuries. Froot, Kim, and Rogoﬀ (2005) describe the construction of their series, which is provided
in both nominal and real terms for the following commodities: wheat, oats, eggs, cheese, butter,
barely, and peas. We assign the exposure of each state to each of these commodities at diﬀerent
points in time using the most recent available data we can ﬁnd on the composition of the state’s
agricultural sector. When we cannot ﬁnd ‘hard data’, we employ historical documents that indicate,
for example, “Minnesota, California, and Illinois were the chief wheat states in 1890” and assign
an exposure of 1 for these states to the respective commodity in the relevant years.14 Taking the
average of the England and Holland prices for a given year, we assign price changes to the state
based on a state’s weighted average exposure to the commodities in that year. As the last column
of Table 8 shows, commodity price shocks aﬀecting the agricultural sector of each state exhibit no
relationship with usury laws.
Hence, none of the agricultural shocks (technology, weather, demand, or commodity prices)
exhibits any association with ﬁnancial regulation as it pertains to usury. The coeﬃcients on the
various shocks are not reliably diﬀerent from zero, economically small, and oscillate in sign. This
evidence does not support prediction 97of the public interest view. Since these shocks likely had
little aﬀect on the industrial sector, the lack of a link to usury laws supports the industrial private
interest view.
F. Alternative explanations using cross-sectional evidence from 1850
Table 9 examines the determinants of usury laws on the cross-section of states in 1850 that employs
a host of additional state-level variables, only available from the 1850 Census, that may capture
alternative explanations.15
F.1 Proxies for bank market power
The ﬁrst two rows of Table 9 examine the relationship between usury laws and proxies for bank
market power: a bank Herﬁndahl concentration index based on bank capital and the amount of
bank capital per capita in the state (bank wealth).16 Maximum legal rates are negatively, but
insigniﬁcantly, related to banking concentration and wealth. This null result has two possible
14Statements and data pertaining to “grains” are assigned equally to oats and barely prices, information on “dairy”
is assigned equally to cheese and butter prices, and information on “vegetables” is assigned to prices for peas.
15The 1850’s were also a time of unparalleled growth and changes in ﬁnancial regulation in the U.S., making it an
interesting time period to study.
16Results are similar if we scale number of banks and bank capital by number of establishments instead of population.
26interpretations. First, if bank market power proxies for ﬁnancier incumbent power, then these
results suggest that ﬁnancier incumbent private interests are not determining ﬁnancial regulation.
Second, the premise of the public-interest view of usury is to protect citizens against the market
power of banks. Accordingly, prediction 4 conjectures a relationship between bank market power
and tight usury restrictions under the public interest theory that is not supported by the data.
F.2 Proxies for bureaucratic capital
The third row of Table 9 reports results from regressing the maximum legal interest rate on the
percentage of people employed as city oﬃcers or lawyers per employed persons. The idea here is
to test whether more developed bureaucracies, proxied by the dearth of city oﬃcers and lawyers,
may be better able to pass and enforce usury laws, whereas states without bureaucratic capital or
experience may simply not be able to maintain such regulation. There is no signiﬁcant relationship
b e t w e e nt h i sp r o x ya n du s u r yr a t e s ,t h o u g ht h es i g ni si nt h er i g h td i r e c t i o n .
F.3 Proxies for borrower sophistication
The public-interest theory is predicated on protecting borrowers from the market power of lenders.
In particular, less sophisticated borrowers require the most protection from bank market power
and require more social insurance. Tighter usury laws are therefore more likely to exist where
less sophisticated borrowers are present, according to the public interest view. As a proxy for the
ﬁnancial sophistication of residents in a state, we employ the number of pupils or publishers per
employed persons in the state, controlling for the variables that include per capita capital, a proxy
for household wealth. The relationship between maximum legal rates and percentage of pupils and
publishers is negative, suggesting that states with more sophisticated residents have lower legal
rates. This result is opposite to that predicted by the public-interest hypothesis. However, if the
percentage of pupils and publishers proxies for the incumbent elite, then the negative relationship
with usury rates may be consistent with private interests.
F.4 Religious motives
Finally, we consider the role religion might have played in determining usury laws. Previous research
documents a role for religion in the determination of usury laws in Europe centuries prior (Ekelund,
Hebert and Tollison (1989), Nelson (1947), and Nelson (1969)). Moreover, recent studies show that
27religion and ﬁnancial or economic development are related (Stulz and Williamson (2003), Guiso,
Sapienza, and Zingales (2003), and Barro and McCleary (2003)).
While some writers claim that prohibition of interest is the decisive criterion of the diﬀerence
between the Catholic and Protestant ethic, Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison (1989) argue that in
Europe usury laws were aﬀected by the inﬂuence of the Roman Catholic church due to the church’s
rent-seeking behavior. Hence, the apparent inﬂuence of religion is driven more by private economic
interests.17 It seems unlikely, however, that the rent-seeking behavior of the church was an important
factor in determining usury laws during the 19th century in the U.S. Moreover, given the protestant
origins of the U.S and religious freedom during the 19th century, religion is less likely to play a
prominent role in the determination of U.S. usury laws. More broadly, we investigate the role of
religion as a proxy for conservative attitudes toward lending. In the last two rows of Table 9,
we regress the maximum legal rate on the number of church accommodations (seating capacity
summed across all churches, temples, synagogues, and other religious dwellings) per capita and
religious accommodations per capita attributed to the Roman Catholic Church. More religious
states adopt more strict usury laws. This result may be consistent with either the public or private
interest view of ﬁnancial regulation. However, in sharp contrast to evidence from Europe, a higher
presence of Catholicism is related to lax usury laws. In fact, 1850 followed a period of a wave
of Irish and German immigration to the U.S. that heightened the tension between Catholic and
Protestant views. Consequently, this period should show a strong relation between usury strictness
and Catholic inﬂuence if religion is an important driving force. The contrasting results in Europe
and the U.S. suggest it is not religious beliefs per se that are driving usury laws.
VI. Usury Laws and Economic Growth
The literature on ﬁnancial development and economic growth emphasizes the importance of ﬁnan-
cial development in allocating resources to their best use. While much of the literature studies
cross-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial development, we study ﬁnancial regulation within ac o u n t r y ,
essentially holding other factors such as institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson (2001)) and legal ori-
17Weber (1930) argues that usury laws had a parallel in almost every religious ethic in the world. According to
Nelson (1969), Calvin was the key ﬁgure in abolishing the restrictions on lending. Furthermore, Nelson (1969) argues
that the ancient prohibition against lending at interest was removed abruptly with the Protestant Reformation. While
Weber (1930) argues that the more liberal attitude of Calvin to usury did not gain a deﬁnite victory, he agrees that
usury laws were abolished by the time of Salmasius.
28gins (La Porta et al. (1997)) ﬁxed.18
We examine usury laws as a measure of ﬁnancial development. Even if usury laws impact ﬁnan-
cial development, they may not have any impact on economic development. We hypothesize that
more restrictive usury laws aﬀect economic growth since they aﬀect lending activity and therefore
some risky, but positive NPV, projects cannot be ﬁnanced. On the other hand, if projects are simply
getting ﬁnanced through other means that we cannot measure (i.e., private loans or “illegal black
market” loans), then the eﬀe c to ng r o w t hm a yb ei n c o n s e q u e n t i a l .
Whether or not ﬁnancial regulation causes economic growth is an empirical question we do
not focus on. Writers and policy makers in the 19th century seemed to believe or at least argue
that usury laws could have an adverse eﬀect on economic growth (see Appendix A). However, the
endogeneity of regulation and economic activity makes this determination diﬃcult. Our goal is to
understand what political and economic forces drive ﬁnancial regulation and link those factors to
economic growth. Indeed, we argue that the omitted variable driving both regulation and growth
may be the political economy and private interests of industrial incumbents.
Table 10 reports results from regressing measures of per capita state economic growth on the
lagged change in maximum legal interest rate. We have four measures of per capita economic
growth: state gross product per capita, manufacturing value added per capita, manufacturing es-
tablishments per capita, and manufacturing employment per capita from the 1850, 1860, and 1870
U.S. Censuses.19 We examine two changes in growth over two decades: from 1850 to 1860 and
from 1860 to 1870. Rather than examine these periods together, since the period from 1850 to 1860
experienced unprecedented growth (Galman (1960) and North (1966)) and since the period 1860 to
1870 contains the Civil War, we report results separately in Panels A and B for each of these two
decades. All regressions contain state age and regional ﬁxed eﬀects as controls.
The ﬁrst column of Panel A of Table 10 reports regression results for the per capita growth in
State Gross Product from 1850 to 1860 on the lagged change in maximum legal rates from 1840 to
1850. Increases in maximum rates are associated with future increases in economic growth for the
state, consistent with prediction 8. A mean increase in the change in the maximum legal rate for a
18Few studies (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004),
Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004), and Burgess and Pande (2005)) oﬀer plausible identiﬁcation strategies that attempt
to document a causal eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on economic growth. Many of these studies look within a country
or region in order to better identify the causal relations.
19We detail the construction of our measures of per capita economic growth in Appendix B.
29state of about 10 basis points translates into a 1.5 percent increase in economic growth. This eﬀect
seems too large to be plausibly caused entirely by usury laws. Rather, as we have shown, usury laws
are determined jointly with other political and economic restrictions, which likely also have aﬀect
growth. We believe omitted political economic factors are jointly determining regulation and real
activity.
The second column of Panel A of Table 10 reports regression results for the growth in manu-
facturing value added per capita on lagged maximum rate changes, and the third column reports
the diﬀerence in growth rates between the manufacturing sector and the rest of the state economy
by regressing the diﬀerence between per capita manufacturing value added growth (column 2) and
gross state product growth (column 1) on changes in maximum rates. The results highlight that
usury law changes had less of an eﬀect on growth in the manufacturing sector than the rest of
the economy. If the manufacturing sector is a proxy for industrial incumbents, then this result is
consistent with prediction 9, where incumbents are less aﬀected by usury laws.
Columns 4 and 5 of Panel A of Table 10 report regression results for the per capita growth in
manufacturing establishments and manufacturing employment, respectively, on lagged changes in
maximum rates. The coeﬃcients are negative, implying that manufacturing establishment growth
a n de m p l o y m e n tg r o w t hw a ss l o w e rt h a nt h eg r o w t hi np o p u l a t i o n .C o m b i n i n gt h e s er e s u l t sw i t h
those from column 2, the results indicate that while valued added per capita for the manufacturing
sector as a whole increased, the number of manufacturing establishments per capita decreased. The
last column of Panel A of Table 10 highlights the statistical signiﬁcance of this fact by regressing
the diﬀerence between manufacturing value added growth and manufacturing establishment growth
on usury rate changes. The positive coeﬃcient is more than 4 standard errors from zero. This result
implies that existing manufacturing ﬁrms increased their value substantially, while the growth rate
in new ﬁrms (per capita) was negative. Hence, within the industrial sector the change in value for
pre-existing ﬁrms (i.e., incumbents) increased while the creation of new ﬁrms decreased. This result
is consistent with incumbent private interests setting policies for their own beneﬁta tt h ee x p e n s e
of potential new entrants. Alternative theories have a diﬃcult time rationalizing how usury law
changes lead to value added growth increases and establishment growth decreases in the industrial
sector.
Panel B of Table 10 reports the same regressions on the 1860 to 1870 sample. The results are
consistent, but weaker, due to limited growth over this decade from the Civil War.
30VII. Conclusion
We examine the political economy of one of the oldest forms of ﬁnancial regulation, usury laws,
and link it to ﬁnancial development and growth in the U.S. in the 19th century. We ﬁrst establish
that usury laws seemed to bind and have an impact on ﬁnancial activity. We then ﬁnd that the
tension between private and public interests can best explain the heterogeneity in regulation across
U.S. states and over time during this period of emerging growth in the U.S. economy. When the
cost of regulation is low, private interests impose tight restrictions to extract rents and impede
competition. When the cost of regulation is high, states relax these constraints as they start to bind
on incumbents themselves. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial regulation is also correlated with other restrictive
political and economic policies adopted by the state that are designed to exclude other groups and
protect incumbent interests. We do not ﬁnd any relationship between usury laws and proxies for
public interests. Finally, we ﬁnd a positive relationship between usury laws and subsequent eco-
nomic growth and argue that this relationship is the outcome of incumbent private interests jointly
determining both regulation and growth through a variety of actions. The collection of evidence
supports the private-interest view of ﬁnancial regulation and highlights the potential endogeneity
of ﬁnancial and economic development. These ﬁndings may provide guidance for the determination
of ﬁnancial policy today in emerging markets and its local and global consequences.
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35Appendix A: The Mindset of Regulators in the 19th Century
Several quotes from legislators at the time highlight the mindset and arguments of regulators in
the 19th century. In a stirring speech against usury laws in the Massachusetts legislature, Richard
Henry Dana pointed to the link between rent seeking behavior and usury laws.
The borrower is no longer the trembling suppliant at the threshold of the patrician
lender. Who are the borrowers now? The railroad, manufacturing, steam-boat and min-
ing corporations. They are borrowers,— those great corporations that are suspected of
controlling the politics of our States and towns. [emphasis added] The States and
National Governments are borrowers, All mercantile enterprises require loans of credit;
and the great merchants and manufacturers are borrowers one day and lenders the next.
The great builders are borrowers.
Again, it is not the poor mechanic that is the borrower. The journeymen the member
from Boston employs, are not borrowers. Hired laborers in this country seldom are. It
is mostly enterprise that borrows, and capital borrowing more capital. (Dana (1867) pp.
20-21.)
Concerns about the relation between the competitiveness of credit markets and usury laws were
reﬂected in the arguments of those in favor of repealing usury laws in the 19th century.
The only practical objection to the repeal, seemed to me to be, the fear that the banks
of discount might combine and keep up an artiﬁcial rate of interest. I have made careful
inquiries on this subject, and am satisﬁed that there is no more practical danger on
that head, than the community must always incur in its ﬁnancial transactions. The
banks are numerous. There will be competition among them. And there is not only the
competition of private lenders at home, but competition from abroad. capital is drawn
toward demand. State lines and town lines are disregarded. Loans are made in a few
minutes by telegraph; and it will more and more be the case that, when an inadequacy
of supply to the demand, or a combination of lenders had raised the rate of usance, an
inﬂux from abroad will bring it to its natural level. (Richard Henry Dana, Jr., Feb. 14,
1867, Speech in the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, pp. 22-23.)
Legislators argued that usury laws had ﬁnancial and economic consequences for state economic
growth. For example, in 1867 during a discussion of the usury bill in Virginia, and following the
request of several members of the Virginia Senate, John Harmer Gilmer published an opinion paper
titled “What is the Eﬀect of the Usury Laws?.” He writes:
Virginia in the past has been almost exclusively an agricultural and planting commu-
nity. It may be unnecessary to pause here to inquire into the causes that gave her this
complexion, or to show why it is that the boundless wealth, nature bestowed upon her
in her water power and minerals, has been allowed to remain in unproﬁtable idleness;
but I think he who examines the question will not deem the assertion, that the spirit of
her usury laws was at least one of the original causes — very extravagant. She undoubt-
edly possesses as many of the elements essential to successful manufacture as any other
36section of the continent, and her people have for centuries trodden beneath their feet
such riches as in other communities would have made the land teem with the opulence
of cities, railroads and canals. But be this as it may, the fortunes of the state took this
direction as an early day in her history, and she has since made but little advance in
wealth or power.(Gilmer (1867) pp. 14.)
Appendix B: Construction of Gross State Product
To the best of our knowledge there are no existing measures of state-level economic activity for the
19th century such as their modern counterparts. We collect data from the seventh (1850), eighth
(1860), and ninth (1870) census reports to construct local measures of economic activity. Before
the 7th census it was diﬃcult to get reliable data for economic activity, thus the period 1850 to
1860 is the earliest period for which data exists and usury laws were in eﬀect and important. We
construct ﬁve diﬀerent measures of economic activity growth at the state level: population, state
gross product, manufacturing value added, establishments, and employment.
Construction of Agricultural Production variables for 1849 and 1859:
For the year 1849, nominal values for agricultural production are given in the census, however the
census reports only quantities (and not nominal values) for many commodities in 1859. To construct
total agricultural production in 1849, we sum across all commodities for which we have prices in
1859 in order to have comparable measures that cover an identical set of commodities. Since for
1859, only real values are reported for agricultural production, we construct nominal values in the
following manner. We obtain the average annual price for each commodity in 1859 by averaging
prices from ﬁve markets (Philadelphia, New York, New Orleans, Cincinnati, Charleston). We then
form nominal production for each commodity by multiplying the reported quantity by the average
annual price. The total production includes production of the following commodities: Corn, wheat,
cotton, oats, butter, wool, tobacco, cane sugar, rye, orchard products, rice, hops, clover seed, cheese,
peas and beans, ﬂaxseed, ﬂax, hemp, molasses and wine. Signiﬁcant commodities for which no price
data was found, and which consequently are excluded from our agricultural production measure are:
Hay, irish potatoes and sweet potatoes.20
Construction of Gross State Product for 1849 and 1859:
Gross state product is formed by summing total agricultural production (as described above), man-
ufacturing annual product and the value of animals slaughtered.
Construction of Manufacturing Value Added for 1849 and 1859:
Manufacturing value added is formed by subtractingt h ev a l u eo fr a wm a t e r i a l su s e di nm a n u f a c t u r e d
goods from the annual product generated by the sale of those manufactured goods.
20Sources for agricultural commodity prices are Bezanson, Anne and Robert D. Gray and Miriam Hussey. “Whole-
sale Prices in Philadelphia 1784-1861. Part II.” Philadelphia, 1937 and Cole, Arthur Harrison. “Wholesale Commodity
Prices in the United States 1700-1861.” Cambridge, 1938.
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Summary Statistics on Maximum Legal Interest Rate and Penalty for Usury
The table reports summary statistics of the maximum legal interest rate and penalty for usury for each state from 1641 to 1891.
The severity of penalty for usury is captured by the sum of all dimensions of the usury penalty code: forfeiture of principal and
interest and loss of principal and interest. States are sorted in ascending order by their average maximum legal interest rate and
then by their severity of penalty for usury in descending order. For the purposes of calculating means, if a state has no limit on
the maximum legal rate, we employ a rate that is 5% higher than the maximum legal rate across all other states in that year as
the maximum legal rate for the state.
Maximum interest rate (%) Penalty for Usury Year of
Avg. Min. Max. #Changes Avg. Min. Max. #Changes Statehood
State + − + −
Virginia 5.73 5 12 2 3 3.65 0.50 4.00 1 1 1788
Delaware 6.00 6 6 0 0 0.61 0.50 1.00 0 2 1787
Maryland 6.00 6 6 0 0 1.50 1.50 1.50 0 0 1788
New Hampshire 6.00 6 6 0 0 2.00 2.00 2.00 0 0 1788
Vermont 6.00 6 6 0 0 4.28 0.50 5.00 0 1 1791
Tennessee 6.19 6 10 1 1 2.55 1.00 4.00 0 1 1796
Pennsylvania 6.19 6 8 1 1 0.91 0.50 1.00 0 1 1787
Kentucky 6.26 6 10 1 2 0.65 0.50 1.00 1 2 1792
North Carolina 6.34 6 8 1 0 3.62 1.00 4.00 1 2 1789
Ohio 6.49 6 8 1 0 0.99 0.50 2.00 2 2 1803
New Jersey 6.64 6 7 1 2 1.82 1.00 2.00 0 1 1787
New York 6.89 6 7 0 1 2.02 0.00 2.50 1 1 1788
Connecticut 7.20 6 none 2 1 2.47 0.00 3.00 0 2 1788
Massachusetts 7.76 6 none 1 0 1.80 0.00 3.00 1 2 1788
Alabama 7.84 6 none 1 1 2.10 0.50 4.00 1 2 1819
Indiana 7.86 6 none 2 3 0.95 0.00 2.50 2 2 1816
District of Columbia 8.10 6 10 1 0 1.48 1.00 2.00 0 1 1871
Georgia 8.14 7 none 2 3 2.89 0.00 5.00 2 4 1788
South Carolina 8.65 7 none 2 4 3.56 0.00 5.00 2 2 1788
Rhode Island 9.02 6 none 1 0 1.37 0.00 2.33 0 2 1790
Michigan 9.08 6 10 2 1 0.64 0.50 1.50 2 1 1837
Mississippi 9.26 6 none 4 2 0.82 0.00 1.00 2 3 1817
Missouri 9.52 6 10 1 2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0 0 1821
Illinois 9.68 6 12 1 3 1.64 1.00 3.00 0 2 1818
Maine 10.14 6 none 1 0 0.99 0.00 4.00 0 2 1820
Arkansas 10.71 10 none 1 1 1.50 0.00 2.00 2 1 1836
Wisconsin 10.92 7 none 2 3 2.37 0.00 3.50 1 2 1848
Iowa 11.06 8 none 1 3 1.24 0.00 1.50 1 2 1846
Texas 12.88 10 none 1 2 0.88 0.00 1.00 1 1 1845
Minnesota 13.12 10 none 0 2 1.67 0.00 4.00 2 0 1858
Louisiana 13.43 8 none 1 1 0.92 0.50 1.00 1 1 1812
Florida 13.48 8 none 2 3 0.66 0.00 2.00 1 2 1845
California none none none 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 1850
mean (stdev.) 7.63 (2.59) 2.22 (1.77)
correlation (max. rate, penalty) = −0.36
38Table 2:
Were Usury Laws Binding?
Panel A reports the correlation matrix between various market interest rates: yields on long-term British government securities
beginning in 1727, the yields of high-grade long-term American bonds from 1798, the average annual U.S. commercial paper rate
from 1831, New England municipal bond yields from 1798, high-grade railroad bond yields from 1857, New York city real estate
mortgage rates from 1869, and the average annual call money rate from 1857. The call money rate is the overnight lending rate
between banks in New York on collateralized loans and was not subject to usury laws. Data are from Homer (1963). All series
are annual (call money rates are available monthly) and end in 1891 to coincide with our usury law data. We also construct an
index of interest rates by weighting each series using the principal components of the covariance matrix of these seven interest
rates. Panel B of Table 2 reports the frequency (number and percentage of years) with which the maximum legal rate for a state
is binding relative to the U.S. bond rate, commercial paper rate, high-grade railroad bond rate, and call money rate. These rates
were not subject to usury laws. States are sorted in ascending order by their average maximimum legal interest rate.
Panel A: Correlation matrix of market interest rates
UK US Commercial NE Railroad NY Call money Principal
bonds bonds paper municipal bonds mortgage rate component
Sample begins: 1727 1798 1831 1798 1857 1869 1857 index
UK bonds 1.00 0.81 0.50 0.86 0.88 0.84 0.34 0.77
US bonds 1.00 0.45 0.79 0.86 0.86 0.40 0.75
CP 1.00 0.73 0.74 0.55 0.91 0.91
NE municipal 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.55 0.94
Railroad bonds 1.00 0.92 0.57 0.95
NY mortgage 1.00 0.42 0.84
Call money 1.00 0.77
39Panel B: Frequency of Maximum legal rates below market interest rates
Maximum rate < US bonds Commercial paper Railroad bonds Call money
State #years %years #years %years #years %years #months %months
Virginia 18 11.1% 34 21.0% 10 6.2% 88 9.5%
Delaware 18 10.5% 37 21.6% 14 8.2% 105 11.3%
Maryland 18 9.0% 37 18.6% 14 7.0% 105 11.3%
New Hampshire 18 17.8% 37 36.6% 14 13.9% 105 11.3%
Vermont 18 17.1% 37 35.2% 14 13.3% 105 11.3%
Tennessee 18 11.9% 34 22.5% 10 6.6% 83 8.9%
Pennsylvania 18 9.4% 37 19.3% 14 7.3% 105 11.3%
Kentucky 18 19.1% 35 37.2% 11 11.7% 84 9.1%
North Carolina 18 11.9% 32 21.2% 6 4.0% 65 7.0%
Ohio 17 18.3% 35 37.6% 9 9.7% 79 8.5%
New Jersey 8 5.2% 35 22.7% 6 3.9% 86 9.3%
New York 5 2.9% 28 16.0% 0 0.0% 51 5.5%
Connecticut 18 9.5% 36 18.9% 12 6.3% 84 9.1%
Massachusetts 18 7.2% 30 12.0% 7 2.8% 43 4.6%
Alabama 8 9.2% 20 23.0% 0 0.0% 31 3.3%
Indiana 3 4.1% 24 32.4% 7 9.5% 55 5.9%
DC 2 4.8% 18 42.9% 10 23.8% 76 8.2%
Georgia 0 0.0% 24 18.0% 0 0.0% 26 2.8%
South Carolina 5 2.5% 22 10.9% 0 0.0% 12 1.3%
Rhode Island 18 14.4% 28 22.4% 5 4.0% 33 3.6%
Michigan 0 0.0% 11 15.3% 0 0.0% 12 1.3%
Mississippi 8 9.2% 14 16.1% 0 0.0% 6 0.6%
Missouri 0 0.0% 15 19.0% 0 0.0% 12 1.3%
Illinois 0 0.0% 12 16.4% 0 0.0% 12 1.3%
Maine 3 4.2% 34 47.9% 11 15.5% 71 7.7%
Arkansas 0 0.0% 9 10.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Wisconsin 0 0.0% 5 9.4% 0 0.0% 12 1.3%
Iowa 0 0.0% 6 11.3% 0 0.0% 12 1.3%
Texas 0 0.0% 1 1.9% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Minnesota 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
Louisiana 3 3.4% 15 17.2% 0 0.0% 9 1.0%
Florida 0 0.0% 15 21.4% 0 0.0% 9 1.0%
California 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
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Do Usury Laws Matter?
Panel A reports results from regressing the change in total penalty for a state in a given year on the change in the maximum legal
interest rate as well as the change in the diﬀerence between the maximum legal rate and the U.S. bond rate, principal component
index rate, and Regional rate in that year. The U.S. bond rate and principal component index rate are described in Table 2. The
Regional rate is constructed as the New England municipal bond rate for all states in the New England region, the New York city
mortgage rate for New York state, and the U.S. bond rate for all other states. We run the regressions in ﬁrst diﬀerences, with
controls for age and state ﬁxed eﬀects when using the U.S. bond and principal components index rates, and state and year ﬁxed
eﬀects when using the Regional rates. Standard errors are clustered by state or year. Panel B reports results for the impact of
usury laws on lending volume. The ﬁrst four columns report results using the total amount of loans and discounts per capita as
the dependent variable and the last four columns report results using the total bonds for circulation per capita as the dependent
variable, obtained from state-level banking-sector balance-sheets for the years 1865 to 1890 from the reports of the comptroller
of the currency. Loans and discounts were subject to usury laws, while bonds for circulation were not. Regressions are run in
ﬁrst diﬀerences using the maximum legal rate and the maximum rate relative to the interest rates. All regressions also include
the state’s age as a regressor. Adjusted R2s are reported for the full speciﬁcation that includes the ﬁxed eﬀects as well as the
amount of remaining variation explained by the regressors after the ﬁxed eﬀects are accounted for ( ¯ R2 after F.E.).
Panel A: Are Penalties Tougher When Maximum Rates are More Binding?
Dependent variable = ∆ Penalty for violating usury
∆ Max. rate -1.005
(-3.34)
∆(Max. rate−US bond) -0.059
(-4.66)
∆(Max. rate−PC rate) -0.044
(-4.38)
∆(Max. rate−Regional rate) -0.063
(-4.71)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year? yes no no yes
State? yes yes yes yes
¯ R
2 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.11
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07
Cluster state year year year
Panel B: Impact of usury laws on lending volume
Dependent variable = ∆Loans and discounts per capita ∆Bonds for circulation per capita
∆ Max. rate 0.982 -0.039
(2.38) (-1.62)
∆(Max. rate−US bond) 1.013 -0.028
(2.58) (-1.31)
∆(Max. rate−PC rate) 0.840 -0.043
(2.44) (-1.65)
∆(Max. rate−Regional rate) 0.926 -0.043
(2.43) (-2.41)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year? yes no no yes yes no no yes
State? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
¯ R
2 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.21
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
Cluster state year year year state year year year
41Table 4:
Is Regulation Tighter When it is Less Costly?
The ﬁrst three columns of Panel A report results from regressing the change in the maximum rate for a state on
the lagged change in the diﬀerence between the maximum legal rate and the U.S. bond rate, principal component
index rate, and Regional rate, respectively last period. The last column of Panel A repeats the regression using
Regional rates by separating the diﬀerence between the lagged maximum legal rate and Regional rate into positive
and negative components, where the Regional rate exceeds the maximum rate and where it falls below the maximum
rate. Panel B reports results from regressing the maximum allowable interest rate on dummies for ﬁnancial crisis
years (1857, 1873, and 1884) and the year following each crisis, as well as the lagged diﬀerence between the maximum
legal rate the Regional rate and its interaction with crisis years. Also reported are interactions between crisis years
and proxies for the impact of the crisis on the state’s economy: the total number of railroad track miles that defaulted
divided by the number of manufacturing establishments in the state during the 1873 crisis (Railroad failure), the
amount of manufacturing capital per manufacturing establishment in 1870, and the amount of machinery capital per
capita in 1870. Panel C reports results from regressing the maximum legal interest rate for a state in a given year on
the contemporaneous average maximum legal interest rate of states that border and do not border it. The average
state border maximum legal interest rate is also interacted with the wealth (per capita output) of the state and the
average wealth of the border states. Finally, the last column of Panel C reports results from regressing the change in
loans per capita on dummies for whether the state changed its usury laws in the opposite direction as its neighbors.
Regressions are esimated with year and/or state-level ﬁxed eﬀects and include age as a regressor (coeﬃcients not
reported). Standard errors used to compute t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated assuming group-wise
clustering at either the state or year level. Adjusted R2s are reported for the full speciﬁcation that includes the ﬁxed
eﬀects as well as the amount of remaining variation explained by the regressors after the ﬁxed eﬀects are accounted
for ( ¯ R2 after F.E.).
Panel A: How do Maximum rates respond to market rates?
Dependent variable = ∆ Maximum legal rate
∆(Max. rate − US bond rate)t−1 -0.064
(-4.90)
∆(Max. rate − PC rate)t−1 -0.072
(-4.90)
∆(Max. rate − Regional rate)t−1 -0.103
(-5.12)
...Regional rate< Max. rate 0.099
(2.93)
...Regional rate> Max. rate -0.103
(-5.11)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year? no no yes yes
State? yes yes yes yes
¯ R
2 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
Cluster year year year year
42Panel B: How do Maximum rates respond to Financial Crises?
Dependent variable = levels changes changes levels levels levels
Crisis 1.345 0.319 0.401
(3.49) (3.09) (2.30)
(Max. rate− Regional rate)t−1 -0.099 -0.094
(-4.97) (-4.11)
Crisis × (Max. rate− Regional rate)t−1 -0.014
(-2.60)
Crisis × railroad failure 136.495
(2.17)
Crisis × manufacturing capital 0.241
(1.66)
Crisis × machinery capital 0.177
(2.27)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year? no no no yes yes yes
State? yes yes yes yes yes yes
¯ R
2 0.49 0.06 0.06 0.59 0.56 0.56
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.08
Cluster year year year year year year
Panel C: How do Maximum rates and lending volume respond to Competition?
Dependent variable = Max. ratet Max. ratet ∆ Loans per capita
Max. rate of border statest 95.869 63.062
(6.03) (2.79)
Max. rate of non-border statest 10.812 50.682
(0.11) (0.41)
Border × own wealth -0.039
(-3.05)
Border × border wealth 0.238
(2.15)
∆ border rate> 0, ∆ own rate< 0 -3.486
(-2.78)
∆ border rate< 0, ∆ own rate≥ 0 1.565
(2.41)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year? yes yes yes
State? yes yes yes
¯ R
2 0.72 0.75 0.18
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.42 0.47 0.02
Cluster state state state
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Private Interests and Incumbent Political Power
Panel A reports results from regressing the maximum legal interest rate for a state in a given year from 1641 to 1891 on
proxies for the political power of incumbents: a dummy variable indicating whether the state had suﬀrage laws that only
allowed land owners and/or those who paid taxes to vote, and the percentage of white males who did not vote, available for 23
states for the following election years: 1824, 1828, 1832, 1836, 1840 and 1844. Panel B reports results on the relation between
suﬀrage restrictions and general incorporation restrictions as well how both suﬀrage and incorporation regulation behave in
ﬁnancial crises. Regressions are esimated with year and/or state-level ﬁxed eﬀects and include age as a regressor (coeﬃcients not
reported). Standard errors used to compute t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated assuming group-wise clustering
at the state level. Adjusted R2s are reported for the full speciﬁcation that includes the ﬁxed eﬀe c t sa sw e l la st h ea m o u n to f
remaining variation explained by the regressors after the ﬁxed eﬀects are accounted for ( ¯ R2 after F.E.).
Panel A: Restricted suffrage and Usury laws
%Non-voting
Dependent variable = Max. rate white males Max. rate Max. rate Max. rate Max. rate
Restricted suﬀrage -1.318 12.284 -3.058 -22.945 -1.446
(-2.71) (3.17) (-12.02) (-7.15) (-7.42)
%Non-voting while males -1.510 -0.646 2.122
(-3.01) (-1.60) (5.34)
Restricted suﬀrage × %NVWM -5.033
(-6.67)
Restricted suﬀrage × Crisist 0.059
(1.56)
Restricted suﬀrage × Crisist+5 -0.420
(-2.51)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year? yes yes yes yes yes yes
State? yes yes yes yes yes yes
¯ R
2 0.56 0.89 0.48 0.52 0.55 0.56
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.03
Cluster state state state state state state
Panel B: restricted suffrage, incorporation laws, and financial crises
Dependent variable = Restricted incorporation Restricted incorporation Restricted suﬀrage
levels changes levels changes levels changes
Restricted suﬀrage 0.219 0.002
(3.71) (3.09)
Crisis -0.013 -0.017 -0.001 0.005
(-0.90) (-1.09) (-0.02) (0.85)
Fixed eﬀects:
Y e a r ? n on on o n o y e s y e s
State? yes no yes no yes no
¯ R
2 0.52 0.01 0.68 0.02 0.44 0.02
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.24 0.01 0.35 0.02 0.16 0.00
Cluster state state state state state state
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Industrial vs. Bank Incumbent Political Power
The table reports results from regressing the maximum legal interest rate for a state in a given year on proxies for the
political power of industrialists and bankers, as well as a proxy for egalitarian law or the most laisse faire regulation.
Industrial incumbent political power is greatest when the state adopts restricted suﬀrage laws and restricts general
incorporation in order to restrict entry. Egalitarian law implies no restrictions on suﬀrage laws or general incorporation.
Two indicator variables are created to capture these preferences. Banking incumbent power is deﬁned using free banking
laws that opened access to outside banks and were only relevant until 1861. An indicator variable is set equal to one for
states with free banking laws that allow outside banks to compete in the state in a given year. The last two columns
report results deﬁning industrial and bank power and egalitarian law using all three forms of regulation. Industrial power
equals one if there are restricted suﬀrage laws, restricted general incorporation laws, and no restrictions on free banking
laws in a given state and year. Banking power equals one if there are restricted suﬀrage laws, no restrictions on general
incorporation laws, and restricted free banking laws. Egalitarian law equals one if there are no restrictions on suﬀrage,
general incorporation, or free banking laws. Regressions are esimated with year and/or state-level ﬁxed eﬀects and include
age as a regressor (coeﬃcients not reported). Standard errors used to compute t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are
calculated assuming group-wise clustering at the state level. Adjusted R2s are reported for the full speciﬁcation that
includes the ﬁxed eﬀects as well as the amount of remaining variation explained by the regressors after the ﬁxed eﬀects
are accounted for ( ¯ R2 after F.E.).
Dependent variable = Maximum legal interest rate
Incumbent power
Restricted suﬀrage and incorporation -1.453 -1.488
(-2.96) (-2.41)
Egalitarian law
No restrictions 0.361 0.0405
(2.04) (2.80)
Free banking laws -0.221
(-0.48)
Industrial incumbent power
Restricted suﬀrage and incorporation, free banking -1.359 -1.194
(-2.92) (-3.18)
Bank incumbent power
Restricted suﬀrage and banking, free incorporation 0.349 0.473
(0.90) (1.31)
Egalitarian law
No restrictions 2.533 2.789
(1.49) (1.62)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year? yes no yes yes no
State? no yes yes no yes
¯ R
2 0.23 0.48 0.67 0.17 0.74
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.11
N 3,715 3,715 2,557 2,557 2,557
Cluster state state state state state
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Penalties for Violating Usury
The table reports results from regressing the penalty index for usury for a state in a given year annually from 1641 to
1891 on a dummy for ﬁnancial crisis years (1857, 1873, and 1884) and the year following each crisis, the contemporaneous
average penalty index of states that border it, a dummy variable indicating whether the state had restricted suﬀrage
laws that only allowed land owners and/or those who paid taxes to vote, and indicator variables for industrial and bank
incumbent power and egalitarian law as deﬁned in Table 6. Regressions are esimated with year and/or state-level ﬁxed
eﬀects and include age as a regressor (coeﬃcients not reported). Standard errors used to compute t-statistics (reported
in parentheses) are calculated assuming group-wise clustering at the state level. Adjusted R2s are reported for the full
speciﬁcation that includes the ﬁxed eﬀects as well as the amount of remaining variation explained by the regressors after
the ﬁxed eﬀects are accounted for ( ¯ R2 after F.E.).
Dependent variable = Penalty index for violating usury
Crisis -0.484
(-6.28)








Industrial incumbent power 0.526
(5.05)





Year? no yes yes no no
State? yes yes yes yes yes
¯ R
2 0.55 0.73 0.64 0.55 0.58
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.10 0.29 0.04 0.09 0.12
N 3,715 3,715 3,715 3,715 2,257
Cluster state state state state state
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Proxies for Public Interests
The ﬁrst set of proxies we employ for public interests are a set of policies designed to protect the poor and weak debtors:
bankcruptcy stay laws or debt moratoria passed by state legislatures. We use a dummy variable for whether a state had
bankruptcy stay laws that forgave personal debt, obtained from personal bankruptcy laws from Coleman (1975) and use the
percentage of representatives in each state voting in favor of debt relief in the House of Representatives in 1822 for the relief
of debtors who bought public land from the Federal government. The second set of proxies we employ for public interests are
the extent of newspaper circulation and the coverage of political and corruption stories, obtained from Gentzkow, Glaeser,
and Goldin (2005) and Glaeser and Goldin (2005), respetively. The extent of political and corruption coverage of newspapers
is approximated by the count of the word “politic” deﬂated by the count of the word “January” which controls for the
newspaper’s size, and corruption and fraud coverage is estimated as the count of the word “corrupt” or “fraud” deﬂated by
the word count “January.” The third set of proxies for public interests we employ are a series of agricultural shocks that had
l i t t l et on oe ﬀect on the industrial sector: agricultural technology shocks, obtained from “A History of American Agriculture”
from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) from 1780 to 1890, extreme weather shocks, demand shocks for
agricultural products, and a series of commodity price shocks to capture shocks to the agricultural sector in each state.
Speciﬁcally, we use the Froot, Kim, and Rogoﬀ (2005) commodity price series from England and Holland which spans the
17th, 18th, and 19th centuries. For all of these measures we assign the exposure of each state to each of the shocks at diﬀerent
points in time using the most recent available data we can ﬁnd on the composition of the state’s agricultural sector.
Dependent variable = Maximum legal rate
Bankruptcy stay -0.536
(-0.97)
Debt moratoria vote -0.072
(-0.08)






Agriculture technology shocks -0.035
(-0.45)
Agriculture weather shocks -0.030
(-0.89)
Agriculture demand shocks -0.015
(-0.34)
Commodity price shocks 0.003
(0.27)
Fixed eﬀects:
Year? yes yes no no no yes yes yes yes
State? no no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
¯ R
2 0.31 0.25 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06
¯ R
2 after F.E. 0.20 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 1,934 3,040 3,715 2,337 2,337 2,935 2,935 2,935 2,320
Cluster state state state state state state state state state
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Alternative Explanations Using Cross-Sectional Evidence from 1850
The table reports results from regressing a state’s maximum legal rate in 1850 on alternative explanations that might inﬂuence
usury laws: two measures of bank market power (a bank Herﬁndahl concentration index and average bank wealth), number of
city oﬃcers and legal professionals per employed persons, number of pupils and publishers per capita, number of religious seating
accomodations per capita, and percentage of Roman Catholic accomodations. Regressions include the percentage of gross state
product from the banking and manufacturing sectors, a dummy variable for Civil law states, the age of the state, capital per
capita, and region ﬁxed eﬀects (coeﬃcients not reported for brevity). Adjusted R2s are reported.









Religious accomodations per capita -0.107 -0.153
(-5.77) (-6.95)
%Roman Catholic accomodations 0.091
(5.86)
¯ R
2 0.41 0.36 0.52 0.71 0.65 0.71
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The Relation Between Usury Laws and Economic Growth
Panel A (Panel B) reports results from regressing measures of per capita state economic growth from 1850 to 1860 (1860 to
1870) on the change in maximum legal interest rate from 1840 to 1850 (1850 to 1860). Four measures of per capita economic
growth are employed: state gross product per capita, manufacturing value added per capita, manufacturing establishments
per capita, and manufacturing employment per capita from the 1850, 1860, and 1870 U.S. Censuses and described in Appendix
B. Panels A and B also report results from regressing the diﬀerence in growth rates between the manufacturing sector and
all other sectors in terms of product and employment on the change in maximum legal rates. Regressions include a dummy
variable for Civil Law states, the age of the state, and region ﬁxed eﬀects as control variables (coeﬃcient estimates not reported
for brevity). Adjusted R2s are reported and t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated using White-corrected standard errors.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Per capita State Gross Manufacturing Diﬀerence Manufacturing Manufacturing Diﬀerence
growth rates in: Product Value Added (2)−(1) Establishments Employment (2)−(3)
Panel A: Dependent variable = Economic Growth rate from 1850 to 1860
∆Max. rate1840:1850 15.40 1.09 -14.31 -5.22 -5.37 6.32
(4.26) (2.60) (-4.44) (-4.77) (-4.75) (4.25)
Fixed eﬀects: region region region region region region
¯ R
2 0.35 0.15 0.37 0.41 0.40 0.35
Panel B: Dependent variable = Economic Growth rate from 1860 to 1870
∆Max. rate1850:1860 5.91 0.38 -5.53 -1.98 -2.03 2.36
(2.49) (1.47) (-2.59) (-2.68) (-2.66) (2.41)
Fixed eﬀects: region region region region region region
¯ R
2 0.14 0.03 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.13
49Figure 1. Evolution of Average Maximum Allowable Interest Rate and Usury Penalty
.






































* Civil War end























xFigure 2. Market Interest Rates and Maximum Legal Rates
.
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